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ESSAY
The Compromised Right to Education?
Joshua E. Weishart'
Introduction
IndianaJones's quest to discover the holy grail in The Last Crusade leads him
to a hidden grotto lined with chalices, a Nazi, and a medieval knight. The Nazi
sips from an ornate, gold chalice accented with jewels, convinced he has chosen
the true grail. He is mistaken and pays for it with his life, disintegrating into a
heap of ash. Jones, the archaeologist, selects a humble, dusty goblet, surely the
cup of a first-century carpenter. The knight confirms that Jones has "chosen
wisely," but warns the grail cannot be taken far from the vault, for "that is the
boundary and the price of immortality."' Oddly enough, that memorable scene
replayed in my mind as I read Derek Black's absorbing article, The Constitutional
Compromise to Guarantee Education.
2
Black takes us on a quest to discover another elusive grail-a federal right
to education-which has captured the imagination of the likes of Erwin
Chemerinsky and Cass Sunstein, among scores of other scholars. 3 Their ornate
legal theories accent the right with laudatory dicta, evolving precedent,
dynamic constructs of substantive due process, or refurbished equal protection
doctrine, all of which Black eschews. The Supreme Court swiftly dispatched the
latter equality-based theory to the ash heap of misguided precedents. 4 And
Associate Professor of Law and Policy, College of Law andJohn D. Rockefeller IV School
of Policy and Politics, West Virginia University. My thanks to Derek Black for
welcoming and encouraging this response and to the editors of the Stanford Law Review
Online for their diligent editorial assistance. Thanks as well to Robert Bastress, Valarie
Blake, Stephen Smith Cody, William Rhee, John Taylor, and Matthew Titolo for their
comments on an earlier draft of this response.
1. INDIANAJONES AND THE LAST CRUSADE (Paramount Pictures 1989).
2. Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Compromise to Guarantee Education, 70 STAN. L. REV. 735
(2018).
3. See id. at 756 n.99 (citing, inter alia, Erwin Chemerinsky, The Deconstitutionalization of
Education, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 111, 123 (2004)); id. at 757-61; see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE
SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND WHY WENEEDITMORE THAN
EVER 99-100 (2004).
4. See Black, supra note 2, at 755-56 (discussing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973)).
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Black worries that educational adequacy- or liberty-based theories would meet
the same fate.5 So, he dusts off the pages of the congressional record circa 1866
and posits a more humble origin of the right, arising from the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment, specifically its Citizenship Clause. 6 What emerges
from this "originalist theory" is a compromise: education as a federal right of
state citizenship. 7 That right-entailing a federal "process-based' oversight" of a
state guarantee-is "narrowly constrained by historical facts" and the boundary
of federalism, Black admits, but such is the price for the immortality of his
theory that "avoids the political and judicial skepticism other theories
occasion."8
Behind his theory's plainly historical facade is a "structural originalism" that
frames the original intent and understanding of the terms of ratification around
the placement of a federal right to education in state constitutions. 9 Though
nuanced, Black's argument here is fairly straightforward: If Congress intended
to guarantee education as a federal right of state citizenship through the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, then it would have conditioned the
readmission of Southern states on rewriting their state constitutions to
mandate the provision of education to all children. In fact, the Southern states
eventually ratified the Fourteenth Amendment and approved state
constitutions with education clauses affirmatively obligating them to provide
education to all children. 10 Therefore, Congress intended to guarantee
education as a federal right of state citizenship through the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
There is a seductive force to this revisionist history, but as with any
conditional argument of this sort, the truth of its premises does not ensure the
truth of its conclusion.
Start with the first premise, that Congress conditioned Southern states'
readmission on rewriting their state constitutions to mandate the provision of
education to all their citizens. The Reconstruction Acts of 1867 and 1868
included no such condition. An amendment to include it "failed by the
narrowest margin, by a vote of 20 to 20."11 Still, Black contends that the
condition was made implicit by a belief among some senators that an educated
5. See id. at 756-59, 764.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside.").
7. See Black, supra note 2, at 746-47.
8. Id.at 747-48.
9. Cf Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 401 (2009)
(explaining that, when courts invoke "structural originalism," the "structural arguments ...
have all been deeply grounded in and intertwined with history, and history has typically
played the lead role in the structural interpretations").
10. See Black, supra note 2, at 788-89, 792-93.
11. Id.at 779.
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citizenrywas indispensable to preserving Article IV's guarantee of a republican
form of government-a form that the Reconstruction Acts required Southern
states' constitutions to conform to as a condition for their readmission. What's
more, Black marshals evidence from Southern state constitutional conventions
that delegates well understood that education was necessary to cultivate
citizenship and maintain a republican form of government.
And here is the kicker: When three holdouts, Virginia, Mississippi, and
Texas, had yet to rewrite their state constitutions for readmission, Congress
made the once-implicit condition explicit in statutes requiring these states to
affirm that they would never amend their constitutions "to deprive any citizen
or class of citizens of the United States of the school rights and privileges
secured by the [state] constitution."1 2 All three joined the other Southern states
in adopting education clauses affirmatively obligating them to provide
education to all children-the second, manifestly true premise of Black's
argument.
So then, if both premises are true, how can the conclusion possibly be false?
Because the legislative history and state action are susceptible to another
plausible inference that situates education as a right of both state and national
citizenship. Otherwise, if education is solely a guarantee of state citizenship, I
question whether its recognition as a "process-based" federal right risks the
unintended consequence of devaluing the more substantive state right,
rendering the right to education, in total, compromised.
I. A Federal Right of State and National Citizenship?
That Congress intended to guarantee education as a federal right of state
citizenship through the Fourteenth Amendment is questionable because other
facts suggest that Congress intended such a right to secure national citizenship.
Then-professor Goodwin Liu reached that very conclusion after also
mining the nineteenth century congressional record, before and after
ratification. Liu insisted a fair reading of the legislative history reveals that
Congress vested itself with "broad authority to legislate directly to secure
substantive rights of national citizenship." 13 Among those substantive rights
was education, Liu claimed, as evident from congressional debates in the
decades that followed Reconstruction. "Between 1870 and 1890, members of
Congress repeatedly sought to effectuate the guarantee of national citizenship
through ambitious efforts to provide funding, leadership, and support for
public education." 14 Although that education legislation failed to pass, despite
broad bipartisan support in some instances, the congressional record is replete
12. Id. at 783 (quoting Act ofJan. 26, 1870, ch. 10, 16 Stat. 62, 63; Act of Feb. 23, 1870, ch. 19,
16 Stat. 67, 68; and Act of Mar. 30, 1870, ch. 39, 16 Stat. 80, 81).
13. Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330, 363 (2006).
14. Id. at 369.
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with references to universal education being a responsibility of the federal
government to secure national citizenship. 15
Black cautions that Liu's "broad conception of national citizenship" is "too
bold" given the current legal and political landscape. 16 "It implicates the
longstanding judicial reticence toward affirmative constitutional rights,
implicates the doctrinal complexities that accompany the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, and upsets the entire state-federal relationship with
education."17 Although "none of these hurdles is fatal," overcoming them would
take a seismic doctrinal shift creating "extensive new federal power over
education."1 8 Significantly, however, Black does not take issue with Liu's
historical analysis nor does he take the opportunity to integrate it with his own.
Committed as Black is to the theory that a compromise was forged over state
citizenship, we cannot expect him to square his claims about the pre-ratification
and ratification history with Liu's claims about the pre- and post-ratification
history. 19 So, assuming we have two credible interpretations of the relevant
history, which are we to believe?
That question exposes the problem with vintage Robert Bork originalism.
Trying to discern the collective, original intent of a diverse group of lawmakers
who may have had an "indeterminate intent" or "no intent" whatsoever 20 based
on fragmented, contradictory records more than a century later is a dubious
venture. Take, for example, Congress's implicit condition for Southern states'
readmission. Black adduces it from ideals of citizenship and a republican form
of government he attributes to a handful of senators and an unspecified group
of other senators, neither of whom were sufficient in number to make that
condition explicit in the first place. All of this, in turn, is based on selected
statements made in response to various pieces of legislation before the Senate,
only one of the two chambers of Congress.
In fairness, neither Black nor Liu advocates for old school originalism. 21
Although Black emphasizes Congress's original intent, his argument seems to
15. See id. at 375-95.
16. Black, supra note 2, at 760 & n.122.
17. Id. at 760 (citations omitted).
18. Id.
19. See id. at 745 (contending ratification "secured a sort of constitutional compromise" in
"situating education within state citizenship-as opposed to national citizenship").
20. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 214
(1980).
21. See Black, supra note 2, at 747, 772, 837 (characterizing his "citizenship-based theory of
education" as "originalist" and emphasizing "the original intent of the Fourteenth
Amendment," but noting his theory is not "the only plausible theory" and that other
"theories grounded in substantive due process, equal protection, privileges and immunities,
or a republication form of government" could be supported by the relevant history); Liu,
supra note 13, at 370 (" [Mly point is not to reveal a singular 'original understanding' of the
Citizenship Clause (there likelywas none), but rather to highlight a sustained and coherent
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rely more on the original understanding of citizenship and a republican form of
government shared by members of Congress and state convention delegates.
Bork took a similar approach in later modifying his originalist theory: "Secret
reservations or intentions count for nothing. All that counts is how the words
used in the Constitution would have been understood at the time [as] manifested
in the words used and in secondary materials, such as debates at the
conventions, public discussion, [etc.]" 22 Yet this move merely compounds the
interpretative difficulties of original intent originalism, attempting to discern
the original understanding "not of one group of Framers, but of many
groupings of persons meeting in a number of ratifying conventions."
23
To typecast Black's argument as hinging on original understanding
originalism, however, is to miss the nuance of his citizenship theory. At
bottom, his argument that the federal right to education guarantees state (as
opposed to national) citizenship is structural. Black argues the right "fits more
accurately in state citizenship because that is exactly where Congress and the
states placed it"-in state constitutions. 24 We should therefore understand his
claims about original intent and understanding in the context of the original
action taken by the Southern states and Congress to advance education for
citizenship while preserving federalism.
25
To be sure, education was a right of state citizenship appearing in a
majority of state constitutions when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified
in 1868. Thirty of the thirty-seven states in 1868 required their legislatures to
establish a system of public schools, according to originalists Steven Calabresi
and Michael Perl.26 They contend that number satisfies the Article V threshold
to amend the Constitution, and thus, the right to education "is a strong
candidate to be a Fourteenth Amendment fundamental right," one "deeply
rooted in American history and tradition."27 Locating the right explicitly in
state constitutions therefore would not be determinative of its scope provided
it otherwise emanates implicitly from "the Fourteenth Amendment [which]
constitutional perspective urged by legislators as an alternative to the judicially elaborated
constitutional order of Slaughter-House and the Civil Rights Cases.").
22. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 144
(1990) (emphasis added).
23. Ronald Turner, On Brown v. Board of Education and Discretionary Originalism, 2015 UTAH
L. REv. 1143, 1154.
24. Black, supra note 2, at 767.
25. Cf Michael D. Ramsey, Beyond the Text:JusticeScalia's Originalism in Practice, 92 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1945, 1947-52 (2017) (contending that adherence to structural imperatives implied
from constitutional design, e.g., federalism, even when "not exclusively text-based," is
consistent withJustice Scalia's strand of originalist methodology).
26. Steven G. Calabresi & Michael W. Perl, Originalism and Brown v. Board of Education,
2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 429, 450-51.
27. Id.at 443, 560-61.
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makes all of us both national citizens and citizens of the state wherein we
reside."2
8
Southern states' collective actions to include education clauses likewise
could be viewed as an effort to constitutionalize an emerging norm of national
citizenship. 2 9 Although Black asserts that "no Southern state constitution
affirmatively obligated the state to deliver education" before the Civil War, 30
that is a matter of interpretation. Louisiana's 1845 constitution included
obligatory language. 31 Arguably so did North Carolina's 1776 constitution
32
and Georgia's 1777 constitution. 3 3 The point being that "education for
citizenship" had been trending steadily decades before ratification, forming a
consensus among states who frequentlyborrowed each other's education clause
language. Black makes this point forcefully himself: "The new and revised state
constitutions of the 1860s drastically reshaped the national consensus regarding
education."3
4
Hence, Black's structural originalist argument based on Southern state
constitutions need not exclude recognition of education as a right of both state
and national citizenship. Nor should Congress's original action exclude that
plausible construction. The one unmistakable action Congress took-not
dependent on a theory of the original understanding of "citizenship" or a
"republican form of government"-was to enact statutes requiring Virginia,
Mississippi, and Texas to affirm that they would never amend their
constitutions "to deprive any citizen or class of citizens of the United States of
the school rights and privileges secured by the [state constitution]."35 If, as
Black contends, this was Congress's way of making the once-implicit condition
for readmission explicit, then it is telling that Congress chose to characterize
"the school rights and privileges secured by [the state] constitution" as being
held by "citizens of the United States."36
28. See id. at 517.
29. See Black, supra note 2, at 744 n.38 ("[A]ffirmative education mandates in [state]
constitutions... creat[ed] a new national norm.").
30. Id. at 788.
31. LA. CONST. of 1845, tit. VII, art. 134 ("The Legislature shall establish free Public Schools
throughout the State, and shall provide means for their support by taxation on property or
otherwise.").
32. N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XLI ("That a school or schools shall be established by the
Legislature, for the convenient instruction of youth .. ").
33. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LIV ("Schools shall be erected in each county, and supported at the
general expense of the State, as the legislature shall hereafter point out.").
34. Black, supra note 2, at 790-9 1.
35. Act of Jan. 26, 1870, ch. 10, 16 Stat. 62, 63 (Virginia); Act of Feb. 23, 1870, ch. 19, 16 Stat.
67, 68 (Mississippi); Act of Mar. 30, 1870, ch. 39, 16 Stat. 80, 81 (Texas).
36. See supra note 35.
The Compromised Right to Education?
71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 123 (2018)
II. A Federal Right that Devalues State Education Rights?
Why should it matter whether a federal right to education is a guarantee of
national as well as state citizenship, so long as it is a guarantee of citizenship
nonetheless? In a word, federalism.
Black sees it as a net positive for his constitutional compromise that a
federal right of state citizenship "fits naturally with prevailing federalism
concepts."37 Still, he concedes it would mean that federal courts can police the
procedural boundaries of only the state guarantee "without mandating any
specific substantive policy" and "without wading into a substantive assessment
of the quality or adequacy of education." 38 Black identifies at least three
"procedural" areas for federal courts to police: (1) unstable funding mechanisms,
(2) educational disadvantages targeted to certain classes or groups, and (3)
systemic disadvantages in educational opportunity across time. 3 9 Although
potentially fertile ground for federal private rights of action, an unintended
consequence may be that this federal, procedural, negative right to education
would eventually supplant state, substantive, positive rights to education.
In a majority of jurisdictions, state constitutional rights to education
already provide a basis for challenging the procedural areas Black identifies and
the substantive educational inequities and inadequacies that would otherwise
not be actionable under the federal right Black envisions. 40 The trouble with
the state right is that too many state high courts are now reluctant to enforce
that right, after decades of school finance litigation: Many encounter legislative
resistance to their orders and worry that judicial remedies breach state
separation of powers principles. 4 1 Black proposes that state courts overcome
this self-inflicted crisis of confidence through proactive interventions. 42 But
perhaps anticipating that state courts will continue to struggle regardless, he
thinks a process-based federal right to education would at least "move litigation
into a federal venue in which states are less able to resist."
4 3
If so, a surge in litigation under a newly-recognized federal right seems
likely to deter enforcement of the state right. Legislators would probably
discount the political costs of resisting state court orders, figuring they can live
to fight another day in federal court. If unsuccessful in that forum, legislators
could reengage their defiance, albeit in more subtle, though possibly equally
37. Black, supra note 2, at 796.
38. Id.at 803-04, 808-09, 816.
39. Id.at 816.
40. See generally Joshua E. Weishart, Equal Liberty in Proportion, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 215,
231-41 (2017) (summarizing history of state constitutional education rights litigation as
yielding "a claim for equal liberty").
41. See id. at 268-70.
42. See Derek W. Black, Averting Educational Crisis: Funding Cuts, Teacher Shortages, and the
Dwindling Commitment to Public Education, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 423, 468 (2016).
43. Black, supra note 2, at 831 & n.495.
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effective, ways. More problematic, the restricted scope of a negative, procedural
federal right to education would disempower federal courts of authority to
compel any specific state action or substantive education policy. We might thus
replay the history of desegregation litigation, only this time with relatively
anemic federal courts. Meanwhile, a federal right to education may be just the
excuse reluctant and beleaguered state judges need to stay their hands, on the
prevailing view that state courts are bound to treat federal law as supreme.
Any resulting devaluation of the state right might be mitigated if a federal
"citizenship-based right to education" triggered Congress's power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 4 Black suggests that paradigm shift
alone "could transform educational opportunity in a way that case-by-case
litigation never could.' 45 But it is difficult to see how Congress's Section 5
remedial power-which the Supreme Court has tightly cabined to protect
federalism values-could justify uniform legislation when the underlying
guarantee is one of state, not national, citizenship.
Would then the constitutional compromise to guarantee education leave
us with a compromised right to education? And, if the constitutional
compromise really is compelled by the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification
150 years ago, are we better off leaving that history in the past? The Court in
Brown v. Board of Education seemed to think so: "In approaching this problem
[of educational inequality], we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the
Amendment was adopted .... We must consider public education in the light
of its full development and its present place in American life throughout the
Nation. "46
Conclusion
Black's affirmative constitutional theory might be the type of originalist
thinking needed to convince a court to recognize a federal right to education. I
hope that court will also be pragmatic, appreciating that a federal right to
education should no more be a relic of 1868 than a dogma of 2018. Rather than
rely on a single, grand constitutional theory, a court should effectuate a
collection of theories-based on the text, the history, first principles, doctrine
from a half-century of federal and state court precedent, and, yes, even social
science-all of which invariably lead to the same conclusion: An equitable and
adequate education is essential to equal citizenship. If a court reaches that
conclusion on its way to recognizing a federal right to education, it will be due
in part to the pathbreaking work of scholars like Derek Black. And, just as
44. Id. at 832.
45. Id.
46. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1954).
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IndianaJones's Last Crusade was not his last, The Constitutional Compromise will
not be Black's final word on this subject. 47
47. See Derek W. Black, The Fundamental Right to Education, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
(forthcoming 2019) (on file with author).
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